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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
MEMORY FOR CONTINGENT VERSUS NONCONTINGENT EVENTS
by
Maricel Cigales
Florida International University, 1994
Miami, Florida
Professor Lorraine Bahrick, Major Professor
Twenty-four 7.5- to 8-month old infants were presented
with two manipulanda and given either behavior-contingent or
noncontingent experience with an object. Infants in the
contingent group learned and remembered the controlling
action for up to 1 week (L(11)=2.83, p<.05), whereas those
in the noncontingent group showed no preference for either
action. There was no evidence of memory, however, for the
familiar object by either group. This surprising finding
may be a result of greater interest in the action than in
the object.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Contingency awareness by human infants was originally
investigated by John S. Watson. Watson (1966) proposed that
contingency awareness is a necessary condition for learning,
and that human infants are born with the adaptive ability to
perceive contingencies. Since Watson's seminal article,
many researchers have investigated the role of contingency
perception in infant development. This paper provides an
overview of the contingency literature and presents findings
from a recent research project on infants' memory for
contingencies.
Chapter 2 begins with an overview of infants' affective
responses to contingencies, followed by a description of
several studies that demonstrate the young infant's ability
to detect and learn behavior-contingent relationships. The
literature review then turns to the matter of how infants
learn behavior-contingent relationships. Two primary areas
of research are addressed in answering these questions,
visual contiguity of contingent stimuli and schedules of
reinforcement. Next, the literature on memory for
contingencies is reviewed. Though limited in scope, this
literature indicates that infants have the ability to
remember behavior-contingent relationships over extended
periods of time. Finally, several studies are reviewed that
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indicate that infants can learn behavior-contingent
relationships via imitation. The literature is then
summarized in Chapter 3, and the thesis of the current
research project is introduced.
Chapter 4 presents the theoretical rationale for the
current research project, followed by the methodology.
Consistent with Watson's position, this thesis maintains
that contingency perception is ethologically significant and
thus is crucial to normal infant development. The results
of the study are presented in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6
integrates the current findings with the existing literature
and suggests new directions for research.
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Chapter II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Cause-and-effect events surround the infant daily. Most
cause-and-effect events occur independent of the infant's
behavior and will be inconsequential for him/her. Other
events may be contingent on the infant's behavior, and their
outcomes may be important to the infant's adaptation in
his/her environment. It seems logically adaptive then for
the infant to learn which events he/she can control and how.
For example, an infant will cry when experiencing discomfort
or hunger, alerting his mother that something is wrong. As
language is acquired, children learn that specific words
often produce the fulfillment of certain needs. Imagine the
fate of an organism who is incapable of learning and
remembering response-contingent relationships. This
organism would likely have difficulty adapting to its
environment.
Affective Responses to Contingencies
Mineka, Gunnar and Champoux (1986) demonstrated the
importance of having control over one's environment in a
study with rhesus monkeys. Results showed that "master"
monkeys, who could control the delivery of food, water, and
treats, displayed less fear and more exploratory behavior of
a mechanical toy than did monkeys who received edibles non-
contingently. These results are supported by Mason (1978)
3
who reported that using dogs as surrogates for rhesus
monkeys was less detrimental than inanimate surrogates. The
author suggests that amelioration of detrimental effects may
be attributed to response-contingent stimulation provided by
surrogate dogs.
Similar results have been shown in 12- to 13-month-old
infants (Gunnar-Vongnechten, 1978). Control over a
potentially frightening toy reduced fear responses in male
subjects and increased positive affect in male and female
subjects. Half of the 24 male and 24 female subjects were
randomly assigned to a controlling condition or a
noncontrolling condition. The potentially-frightening
stimulus was a mechanical cymbal-clapping monkey. Infants
in the controlling condition were trained during a
familiarization phase to hit a panel on a tray before them
in order to activate a toy merry-go-round. Infants in the
noncontrolling condition experienced similar familiarization
with the toy merry-go-round, but were not trained with the
panel. During the test phase the merry-go-round was
replaced by the monkey. Each group was then exposed to the
monkey under its respective condition. Controlling infants
were able to activate the monkey at will while
noncontrolling infants had no control. Subjects in the
noncontrolling condition were yoked to subjects in the
controlling condition in order to equate groups on the
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number of stimulus activations. Thus, each noncontrolling
infant received the same number of stimulus activations, at
the same intervals, as were generated by the previous
controlling infant. Measures of positive affect responses,
proximity to the toy and touching the toy, as well as the
number of toy activations for controlling infants, provided
an index of the infants' positive responses to the stimulus.
Fright was indexed by fussing and crying, support looks to
the mother and closeness to the mother. Results indicated
that infants in the controlling group responded
significantly more positively to the monkey, as indexed by
smiling, laughing and approaching, than did noncontrolling
infants. However, only the male infants showed
significantly greater amounts of negative affect in the
noncontrolling condition than in the controlling condition.
It was concluded that reaction of 1-year-olds to an arousing
event is a function of their control over it. Thus, having
no control produced fearful (for males), or at least neutral
(for females), responses, while control produced positive
responses for both males and females. This study indicates
that even a potentially distressing event can produce a
positive affective outcome in infants when it is contingent
upon their behavior.
Lewis, Sullivan and Brooks-Gunn (1985) found parallel
results in 10-, 16- and 24-week-olds under a contingent
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reinforcement condition. Subjects were assigned to either a
contingent condition, in which arm movements were reinforced
with audio-visual stimuli, or a noncontingent control group.
For infants in both groups, sessions lasted as long as they
remained interested and did not fuss or cry. Affective
measures showed that subjects in the contingent condition
had longer sessions and fussed/cried less than did the
noncontingent control subjects. Subjects at 16 and 24 weeks
of age also smiled more under contingent stimulation than
noncontingent controls of the same age. Interestingly, the
fuss/cry response decreased with age for contingent subjects
and increased with age for noncontingent subjects. Based on
these results, the authors suggest that contingent
stimulation may produce a child who is more involved and
interested in the environment, which may in turn promote
subsequent competence. Speculation aside, this study
indicates that contingent stimulation contributes to longer
task involvement and promotes positive affect. Age
differences on affective measures indicated that the effects
of contingent versus noncontingent stimulation intensified
from 10 to 24 weeks of age.
Watson and Ramey (1969 in Watson, 1971) also found an
increase in positive affect in 2-month-old infants under
conditions of response-contingent reinforcement. Subjects
in the experimental group could cause a mobile, suspended
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above their cribs, to turn for one second by making head
movements against a pressure-sensitive pillow. Control
subjects were exposed to either a noncontingently moving
mobile or one that remained stabile. Subjects in all
conditions were exposed to the stimuli for 10 minutes each
day over a 14-day period. Results showed that experimental
subjects significantly increased backward head movements
while control subjects did not, indicating that experimental
subjects learned that they could control the mobile.
Additionally, experimental subjects displayed vigorous
smiling and cooing toward the mobiles after the third day of
exposure to the contingent reinforcement. This socio-
emotional response was not displayed by infants in the
control groups. These results indicate that contingency
perception is often accompanied by positive affect.
Gunnar (1980) compared the effects of predictability
and control on infants' responses to an arousing, fear-
provoking toy. Twelve-month-old infants were assigned to one
of three conditions; controlling, predicting or non-
controlling. Infants in the controlling condition could
simultaneously activate a potentially frightening toy and a
bell. Infants in the predicting condition could not control
the activation of the toy, but the bell always sounded
first, thus acting as a predictor for the activation of the
toy. Infants in the non-controlling condition had no
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control over the toy and were not provided with the warning
bell. Affect was assessed by the frequency and intensity of
fuss/cry and laugh/smile responses. Results showed that
infants in the controlling condition approached the toy
significantly more than did infants in either the predicting
or noncontrolling conditions. Only infants in the
controlling condition displayed little distress upon the toy
being activated and they explored it more than did the other
two groups. Infants in the predicting condition showed as
much distress and as little exploration of the toy as did
infants in the non-controlling condition. Thus,
predictability did not significantly reduce negative
responses to the toy's activation, while having control did.
Finally, Levitt (1980) found that 10-month-old infants
had more positive affective responses to a stranger if they
could control the strangers initial appearance than if they
could not. In Phase 1, subjects in the 'contingent'
condition, could produced the appearance of the stranger
from behind an occluder by touch a cylinder. In two
'noncontingent' conditions, the stranger appeared either
frequently or infrequently, but her appearance was not
controlled by the infant. The infant's affective responses
were then recorded in a Phase 2 during a "stranger approach"
procedure and a free-play situation. During Phase 1 only
subjects in the contingent condition showed an increase in
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the frequency of touching the cylinder, indicating that they
learned the behavior-contingent relationship. The results
of Phase 2 indicated that infants in the contingent
condition responded more positively (e.g., smiles,
vocalizations and visual orientation) to the stranger when
the stranger was at a distance and less negatively (e.g.,
crying, whimpering and postural or visual avoidance) when
the stranger was near than subjects in the two noncontingent
conditions. Infants in the contingent condition were also
more tolerant of the stranger's intrusions than infants in
the other two groups. Levitt (1985) suggests that
contingent experience may mediate the development of social
relationships.
The studies cited above suggest that infants prefer
situations which they can control. Results indicate that
control over an event is comforting and promotes exploratory
behavior more than uncontrollable events. Because control
reduces negative affect, as well as promoting positive
affect and interaction with stimuli in the environment, it
might therefore facilitate learning. It seems reasonable to
propose that the ability to detect contingencies,
particularly as they relate to our own behavior, is an
adaptive skill. Thus, learning which situations are
contingent upon our behavior and which are not may be
important for survival. At a minimum, it would allow us to
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manipulate our environment in a way that would maximize the
occurrence of positive events and minimize negative ones.
The above studies point to the importance of examining
the dynamics of contingency perception in infants. Perhaps
by determining what properties specify contingencies we can
better understand how infants are able to perceive their
control over contingent events.
The remainder of this review will provide evidence for
which contingent relationships infants are capable of
perceiving and what factors contribute to or inhibit this
process. Furthermore, it will provide an understanding of
how infants learn they have control over contingent events.
Contingency Perception
Watson (1967) showed that the visual fixation behavior
of 14-week-olds could be influenced by contingent
reinforcement. Infants were placed face-up in a bassinet
with a black ceiling containing two translucent circles,
located laterally to the infants' right and left. Infants
could control discrete reinforcements, which consisted of a
tone or lighting of the target circle, by fixating on the
appropriate circle. Infants showed a significant increase
in the rate of visual fixation on the designated circle.
This demonstrates that 14-week-old infants can learn that
performing a particular response will produce a reinforcing
stimulus.
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Watson and Ramey (1969, in Watson 1971) also found that
infants as young as 8 weeks of age can learn to control the
movement of a mechanical mobile suspended above their crib.
The 2-month-old infants were exposed to the mobile for 10
minutes per day, for two weeks. The infants in a contingent
condition could cause the mobile to turn for one second by
applying backward head pressure to a pressure-sensitive
pillow. Results showed that infants who could control the
mobile increased their response rate significantly above
baseline levels across the two-week period, while infants
who had no control did not.
These studies with 8- and 14-week-old subjects show that
infants can perceive contingent relationships at a very
young age. Also, once a contingency is learned, infants
tend to engage in the controlling behavior at a higher rate
than they would when the contingent relationship does not
exist.
Rovee and Rovee (1969) used a conjugate reinforcement
paradigm to test 9- to 12-week-old infants' exploratory
behavior. Under conjugate reinforcement infants were able
to control the frequency, duration and intensity of the
motion of a mobile (which was suspended above their cribs)
via a cord connecting the mobile to one of their feet. For
example, if the infant kicked his/her foot vigorously three
times in five seconds, the mobile would shake vigorously
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three times in five seconds. This differs from the
discrete reinforcement employed by Watson in that infants
can only control frequency of reinforcement under discrete
conditions. Thus, conjugate reinforcement provides
immediate stimulus feedback that is congruent to the target
behavior.
The paradigm used by Rovee and Rovee (1969) consisted of
a training session composed of three phases; 1) a 27-minute
baseline period in which the operant level of foot-kicking
is established, 2) a 15-minute acquisition phase with
conjugate reinforcement, 3) a 5-minute extinction phase.
The phases were separated by 2-minute intervals. Results
showed that infants in the conjugate reinforcement condition
increased their response rate threefold after three minutes
of conjugate reinforcement. Subjects in a noncontingent,
but otherwise identical condition (in which an experimenter
moved the mobile), showed no increase in foot-kicking rate.
This indicates that infants have memory for contingent
events and will choose to produce events when given the
opportunity. Furthermore, the dramatic increase in foot-
kicking rate by subjects who received conjugate
reinforcement suggests that contingent events are highly
rewarding.
The above research on contingency perception has focused
on whether infants perceive and learn contingent
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relationships. A more intriguing and implied question is
how do infants know they have control; what cognitive
mechanisms might be at work in cuing the infant? One answer
to this question is temporal contiguity. The literature
suggests that infants come to perceive their control over an
event when they have repeatedly experienced that event
following a particular behavior (Watson, 1972 & 1967; Rovee
& Rovee, 1969). This implies, simply, that infants learn
that when they do R, S will happen. However, studies
discussed below will show that temporal contiguity is a
necessary but not sufficient component for response-
contingent connections to be made by infants. Other factors
contribute to the infants' ability to learn that a
contingent relationship exists between an event and their
behavior, as well as to identify the particular target
behavior. These factors, discussed below, include visual
contiguity and schedule of reinforcement.
Visual Contiguity and Contingency Perception
Visual displacement of stimuli, relative to the infant's
line of sight, is a second factor which influences
contingency perception. Studies in this area provide
further explanation of how contingency perception might
develop.
Millar and Schaffer (1972) studied the effects of visual
discontiguity between an operantly activated stimulus and
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the controlling manipulandum on contingency perception in 6-
9- and 12-month-old infants. A perforated canister served
as the manipulandum in three conditions. The canister was
placed before the subjects. By touching the canister the
infants could activate the stimuli under conditions of 0, 5,
or 60 degrees of lateral displacement. In the zero
displacement group, colored lights and tones emanated from
inside the canister upon activation. In the two
displacement groups, the audio-visual stimulus was emitted
by a duplicate canister that was displaced either 5 or 60
degrees from the manipulated canister.
Results showed that 6-month-old infants were unable to
learn the task when the response contingent stimulus was
displaced 60 degrees from the manipulandum, just outside of
the infants' visual field. However, with only 5 or 0
degrees of visual displacement, where both the manipulandum
and the feedback stimulus were within the visual field, 6-
month-olds successfully learned the contingency. Nine- and
12-month-olds were able to learn under 0-, 5- and 60-degree
displacement conditions. Thus, 6-month-olds seem to require
visual contiguity between a stimulus and its controlling
manipulandum in order to detect a contingency and learn an
operant task. By 9 months of age, infants are able to learn
contingencies despite such visual discontiguity. This
indicates a broadening of contingency perception with age.
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Cavanagh and Davidson (1977) also found that 6-month-
olds were unable to acquire an operant response when the
visual component of a contingent audio-visual stimulus was
displaced. In this study a colored light display and a tone
were located directly behind a clear plexiglass panel, which
served as the manipulandum for infants in a nondisplacement
condition. In the second condition the visual component of
the stimulus was displaced 60 degrees to the left of the
panel. Infants in the non-displacement condition were able
to learn the contingency while infants in the 60-degree
displacement group could not.
One caution should be noted when interpreting the
results of this study. The audio component of the stimulus
was located directly above the infants in all conditions.
This was done to cue the infants to the visual stimulus,
which was directly in front of them during the contiguous
condition. It is possible that in the 60-degree visual
displacement condition the audio cue confused or misoriented
the infants, thereby confounding the results by producing
competing tendencies to look in two directions at once.
However, Millar (1985) found the same results in a study
with 6- and 12-month-olds. In this study the audio and
visual components were contained within the feedback
stimulus, thus they were jointly displaced. Again, 6-month-
olds were unable to learn a contingency under a 60-degree
15
visual displacement condition, while 12-month-olds acquired
the operant response.
Another study by Millar (1974) lends support to the idea
that 6-month-olds' inability to learn under a 60-degree
displacement condition may be associated with their memory
system. In this study, the manipulandum was directly in
line with a translucent screen, behind which was a set of
lights. Touching the screen caused the lights to turn on.
Thus, the lights were only visible while they were providing
immediate feedback. In the "cue-assisted" condition a
plastic ring circumscribed the area where the feedback would
occur. In the "no-cue" condition the plastic ring was not
present, thus there was nothing marking the area where the
lights were. Results showed that 9-month-olds learned the
contingency under both conditions while 6-month-olds learned
only under the cued condition. The authors concluded that
6-month-olds need a "visual holding cue" during the inter-
response interval in order to learn the contingency. Thus,
visual contiguity between the manipulandum and the feedback
source appears to be an important factor in contingency
perception in infants up to 6 months of age.
Results generated by 9- and 12-month-olds suggest at
least two possible explanations for why 6-month-olds may not
be successful at contingency perception in the absence of
visual contiguity. First, this research suggests that
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displacement of the response-contingent stimulus outside of
the visual field may impose greater demands on the infant's
information storage and recall system. In order for an
infant to learn the relationship between manipulating an
object before him and the subsequent activation of a
stimulus outside of his field of vision, the infant must do
two things; 1) While looking at the manipulandum he must
store some type of information about the feedback stimulus
and be able to recall it in order to remember to turn
towards it for reinforcement upon making the operant
response; 2) While focusing on the feedback stimulus, the
infant must store information about the manipulandum and be
able to recall that it is the means through which he/she can
reactivate the stimulus. It is possible that 6-month-olds'
memory storage and retrieval systems are not sufficiently
developed to facilitate this process, while that of 9- and
12-month-olds are sufficiently advanced. This explanation,
however, seem unlikely.
A second possibility is that of differential attention
strategies between the two age groups. Millar and Schaffer
(1973) observed that 9-month-olds tended to focus on the
feedback stimulus while continuing to touch the
manipulandum. This behavior was not typical of the 6-month-
olds. Consequently, 6-month-olds may not attend to the
stimulus and manipulandum simultaneously, preventing them
17
from learning the contingency.
To summarize, research supports the notion that for
infants as old as 6 months of age, visual contiguity between
stimulus and manipulandum is necessary for acquisition of an
operant response in a contingency task. However, at least
one study (Millar, 1974) suggests that visual holding cues,
in the absence of visual contiguity, can facilitate response
acquisition in 6-month-olds. By 9 months of age infants are
able to overcome the difficulties of a 60-degree
displacement of the contingent stimulus either through a
more developed memory system or more effective attention
strategies.
Schedules of Reinforcement and Contingency Learning
Another factor which influences the learning of a
contingent relationship is the rate and schedule at which
infants' responses are reinforced. Watson (1972) presented
2-month-old infants with contingent and noncontingent
discrete reinforcements across a 14-day period when they
produced foot motions of sufficient intensity to activate a
pressure-sensitive pillow. The infants experienced two 10-
minute sessions daily; one session was run under the
contingent condition and the other under the noncontingent
condition. This procedure produced an initial increase in
activity and response rate followed by a progressive decline
in both across contingent and noncontingent sessions.
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Results suggest that alternating contingent and
noncontingent reinforcement interferes with contingency
perception.
Watson further explored the effects of partial
reinforcement on contingency perception in another
experiment. Reinforcement was provided either 40 percent or
60 percent of the time contingent on infants' backward head
pressure to their pillow. Results showed that under neither
condition did 8-week-old infants learn the contingent
relationship between their behavior and the mobile's
movement. Thus, 8-week-old infants need a rate of
reinforcement higher than 60 percent in order to learn a
behavior-contingent relationship. Unfortunately, this study
did not pinpoint the minimum rate of reinforcement necessary
for 8-week-olds to learn a contingency.
Interestingly, Watson (1979) found that reinforcement of
behaviors that occur at extremely high rates can also
interfere with an infant's ability to perceive
contingencies. Eight-week-old infants were exposed to a
response-contingent mobile reinforcer for 10 minutes per
day, for seven days. Pressure-sensitive pillows were placed
under subjects' legs so that sufficient leg movement would
cause the mobile to turn for one second. Two groups
received identical conditions. However, the pillows were
differentially calibrated so that the one used in group B
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was twice as sensitive to pressure as the one used in group
A. Group A showed a steady increase in response rate and
smiling behavior over the seven-day period, relative to
baseline. However, group B showed no increase in response
rate or smiling over that same period. These results
suggest that reinforcement of the higher frequency behavior
hindered infants' ability to learn the contingency. This is
consistent with Watson's proposal that the probability that
a subject will respond is greater at lower contingency
magnitudes as compared to extremely high magnitudes (Watson,
1979). One reason for this may be that when an event is
contingent upon a very frequent behavior, it is likely that
other behaviors will occur simultaneously. Thus, infants
may not be able to isolate the controlling behavior.
Millar and Watson (1979) studied the effects of delayed
reinforcement on contingency behavior in 6- to 8-month-old
infants. Infants' wide arm movements were audio-visually
reinforced with lights and tones under one of four
conditions, immediate reinforcement, 3-, 6-, or 10-second
delayed reinforcement. In all groups delayed feedback
failed to produce a significant increase in responding
relative to baseline measures. Infants in the immediate
reinforcement group were able to learn the contingency and
significantly increased their response rates above baseline
measure.
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However, Reeve, Reeve, Brown, Brown and Poulson (1992)
were able to successfully train three 4- to 6-month-old
infants to learn a behavior-contingent relationship using a
multiple-baseline across subjects design. The 12-minute
conditioning sessions took place three or four times per
week over a three month period. During the sessions, each
infant was seated facing a panel with a window shade. The
infant's mother was seated behind the shade. The mother's
appearance was contingent on infant vocalizations. Baseline
levels of vocalizations were first assessed. Following
baseline subjects experienced an alternating DRO and delayed
reinforcement phases. DRO consisted of providing immediate
reinforcement of infant behaviors other than vocalizations
with the appearance of the mother. The first phase after
baseline was a DRO phase for all three subjects. The
delayed reinforcement phases consisted of reinforcing infant
vocalizations with the appearance of the mother only after a
3-second delay. The data revealed that all three infants
showed consistently higher rates of vocalizations during the
delayed reinforcement phases than during the DRO phases.
These findings suggest that with sufficient training infants
can learn a behavior-contingent relationship despite a
three-second delay of reinforcement.
These studies point out several factors that are
important in contingency perception. First, if an event is
21
alternately contingent and noncontingent, it tends to
interfere with contingency perception. Though infants might
initially detect the relationship over repeated exposure to
the inconsistent event, their response rate declines. Also,
reinforcement rates of 60 percent or less prevent 2-month-
olds from perceiving the contingency between their behavior
and a subsequent event. A third important finding addressed
the effect of delayed reinforcement on contingency
perception. Six- to 8-month-old infants have been shown to
be unable to detect contingencies if the contingent
reinforcement is delayed by three or more seconds. Perhaps
during initial learning, memory for the feedback-producing
behavior is limited to less than three seconds. One
possibility is that intervening behaviors inhibit infants'
ability to associate the controlling behavior with the
contingent event if there is a delay of three or more
seconds. However, with extensive operant training, 4- to 6-
month-old infants can overcome a three-second delay
condition and learn the behavior-contingent relationship.
Finally, very high rates of contingent stimulation has
also been found to inhibit contingency perception in
infants. This finding suggests that when high frequency
behaviors are reinforced, infants are unable to perceive the
relationship between their behavior and the contingent
event. Perhaps, this is because the event seems to occur by
22
chance, since they cannot isolate the controlling response.
Memor for Contingencies
Though the developmental literature is replete with
studies of infants' memory for features of objects, very few
have addressed infants' memory for events. Fewer still have
investigated infants' memory for contingent relationships
over time. There is, however, one group of studies that
have simultaneously addressed infants' memory for events and
their precipitating contingencies. The conjugate
reinforcement paradigm (Rovee and Fagen, 1976) was used in
these studies and has yielded robust measures of infant
memory.
The conjugate reinforcement paradigm uses foot-kicks as
the dependent variable. It consists of two training
sessions 24 hours apart, and a third session, that assesses
long-term memory, can occur at any interval after session
two. Each training session includes, 1) A three-minute
baseline period, to establish each infant's natural foot-
kicking rate; 2) A nine-minute acquisition phase, in which
the infant can control the motion of a suspended mobile via
a cord connecting the infant's foot to the mobile; 3) A
three-minute extinction phase, in which the infant cannot
control the mobile. The phases are one minute apart. Foot-
kicks are recorded during each phase of both sessions.
The baseline phase of session two is compared to the
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extinction phase of session one to measure the infant's
retention of the contingency across the 24-hour retention
interval. The measured decrease in kicking from session
one, extinction to session two, baseline is an index of
forgetting. Memory over a retention interval of more than
24 hours is assessed by comparing baseline of session three
to extinction of session two (Rovee-Collier and Fagen,
1981).
Sullivan, Rovee-Collier and Tynes (1979) employed this
paradigm to investigate long-term memory for a response-
contingent relationship in 3-month-olds. Subjects received
two training sessions, 24 hours apart. A third occurred
either 96, 144, 192, or 336 hours later, according to each
subject's condition. Subjects showed nearly perfect
retention from session one to session two and demonstrated
long-term retention up to 192 hours, as indicated by no
significant decrease in response rate from session two,
phase three to session three, phase one. Only after an
interval of 336 hours (14 days) did infants show significant
forgetting (i.e., a significant decrease in response rate)
as indexed by foot-kicking rate comparisons.
Forgetting and memory retrieval in 2-month-olds was
further investigated by Greco, Rovee-Collier, Hayne,
Griesler and Earley (1986). After two training sessions,
subjects received a retention interval of 1, 3, 6 or 9 days.
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Response rate was the dependant variable indicating
forgetting. Two-month-olds showed complete forgetting after
a retention interval of more than one day, but showed memory
at one day. That is, after retention intervals of more than
one day, 2-month-olds showed no increase response rates
above baseline levels during the long-term memory test.
In a second experiment, researchers reactivated memory
in 2- and 3-month-olds after complete forgetting had
occurred in both groups. Reactivation occurred 24 hours
prior to the long-term memory test and consisted of showing
the infants the same mobile used in the training sessions
for three minutes, during which the mobile moved non-
contingently. Researchers indexed the differential
contribution of the infants' age and the age of the memory
to retrieval abilities. Infants were tested at 28 and 35
days, following training, using the same long-term memory
test procedure as above in order to explore the limits of
memory reactivation. Results showed that reactivation was
successful at 28 days, but not 35 days, for the 3-month-old
group only. Two-month-olds showed no memory reactivation
after 28- or 35-day retention intervals. Memory
reactivation in two-month-olds is apparently limited to an
18-day retention interval, as demonstrated by Davis and
Rovee-Collier (1983) using the same procedure. Long-term
reactivation results indicated that retrieval was impaired
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by the amount of time that passed between the onset of
forgetting and the presentation of the reminder. In the 28-
day retention interval condition, the reminder was given on
the 27th day. Thus, for 2-month-olds (who show complete
forgetting after 24 hours) 26 days elapsed between
forgetting and the reminder. For 3-month-olds (who forgot
after 14 days) only 13 days passed since forgetting
occurred.
In summary, infants' ability to access memory for a
contingent relationship is a function of the amount of time
that has elapsed since the "onset of forgetting." Two-
month-olds show complete forgetting after periods of more
than one day, while in 3-month-olds memory persists up to
eight days. Retrieval cues successfully reactivate memory
in 2-month-olds after a 18-day retention interval and in 3-
month-olds after as long as 28 days.
Retrieval is also impeded if reactivation cues are
sufficiently discrepant from the training stimulus (Rovee-
Collier, Patterson & Hayne, 1985). Though infants' memory
can be reactivated after forgetting has occurred,
substituting more than one component of the five-component
training mobile with a novel component produced ineffective
reactivation in 3-month-olds in a two-week long-term
retention test. The same effects have been found with 2-
month-olds after a retention interval of only 24 hours
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(Hayne, Greco, Earley, Griesler & Rovee-Collier, 1986).
The duration and distribution of contingent experience
can also determine infants' abilities to remember
contingencies. In a study with 2-month-olds (Linde,
Morrongiello & Rovee-Collier, 1985), researchers exposed
infants to two sessions, either one week or two weeks apart,
using the conjugate reinforcement paradigm. Training phases
varied in duration such that infants received either 6, 12,
or 18 minutes of contingent experience. Only infants who
received 18 minutes of training were able to remember the
contingency two weeks later. In a second condition,
training duration was held constant at 18 minutes, and was
either distributed across three 6-minute training sessions
or was provided in one 18-minute training session. The
results showed that only the infant who received the
distributed contingent experience were able to recall the
contingency two weeks later.
Finally, both 2- and 3-month-olds show response rates
significantly below baseline levels in a 24-hour retention
test when more than one novel component is substituted in
the mobile. These results indicate that 2- and 3-month-old
infants are capable of encoding specific information about
the mobile during training and can detect discrepancies in
its components from the training to the reactivation phase.
Researchers studying contingency perception in infants
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have focused primarily on identifying the temporal and
spatial limits of this ability. Several studies have
investigated the effects of visual displacement of stimuli
(Cavanagh & Davidson, 1977; Millar & Schaffer, 1972, 1973; &
Millar, 1974, 1975) and rates of contingent reinforcement
(Watson, 1972 & 1979; Millar & Watson, 1979) on infants'
ability to perceive and learn relationships which are
contingent on their behavior. However, there is no research
designed to determine how contingency perception in infants
is affected when an event is contingent on another person's
behavior and how this may affect memory. For example, the
conjugate reinforcement paradigm has shown that an infant
can learn the contingency between kicking his/her leg and
the motion of a mobile suspended above his/her crib, as
indicated by a significant increase in response rate above
baseline. Furthermore, memory for this contingent
relationship persists for eight days by 3 months of age.
However, if the same subject were to observe another person
causing the mobile to move in the same manner, would he/she
still be able to detect the contingency? If so, would
memory for the contingency last as long as it would if
he/she had controlled the mobile him/herself? These
questions are unanswered in the current literature.
Nevertheless, insight may be gained from literature found
under the headings of imitation and observational learning.
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Learning Contingencies Via Imitation
Certainly many contingent relations that an infant may
be exposed to are not contingent on the infant's own
behavior. For example, when mom flicks the light switch
when leaving a room, the light turns off. When dad winds-up
the bath tub toy it paddles around the tub. These types of
experiences with contingent relations, though once removed
from the infant's own behavior, are nonetheless a potential
source of learning about actions and objects in the
environment. Thus, another factor that may determine
whether an infant can learn and remember a contingent
relationship is if the contingency is dependent on his/her
own behavior or that of another person. No research to
date, however, has directly addressed this issue.
If young infants can learn other-dependent contingent
relations, a prerequisite for this skill would likely be the
ability to learn object-action relations via observation.
While there is no literature on observational learning by
infants, the imitation literature indicates that infants can
learn and remember object-action relationships by observing
the behaviors of others.
Meltzoff (1985) studied 14- and 24-month-olds' ability
to imitate a simple action on a novel toy under immediate
and 24-hour deferred conditions. Subjects were randomly
assigned to the two conditions. Within each group subjects
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were assigned to one of three test conditions. In the
"imitation" condition an experimenter modeled a target
behavior, pulling the toy apart and reassembling it. This
was done three times in one 20-second presentation period.
In the "baseline" condition the toy was shown to the
subjects for 20 seconds, but the target behavior was not
modeled. This condition controlled for spontaneous
production of the target behavior. In the "activity-
control" condition an experimenter modeled a behavior that
was different from the target behavior three times in 20
seconds. This condition controlled for the possibility that
subjects might be more motivated to manipulate a toy if they
observed an adult touch it, and might thus have a greater
tendency to produce the target behavior. Following
presentations, all subjects were given a 20-second response
period either immediately or 24 hours later. During this
period observers scored whether or not subjects pulled the
toy apart and measured the latency of the response if it was
produced. Strong evidence for imitation was obtained only
for infants in the imitation test condition on immediate and
24-hour delayed tests. A significantly high percentage of
12- and 14-month-old infants in the imitation condition, as
compared with the two control conditions, displayed the
target behavior on immediate and 24-hour delayed tests.
Subjects in the imitation condition had lower mean latency
30
scores than subjects in the two control conditions. These
results were consistent across age and deferred groups.
Furthermore, there were no significant differences between
subjects in immediate and deferred imitation groups. This
study indicated that infants as young as 14 months of age
were able to recall and reproduce target behaviors
immediately and 24 hours after observing the behavior.
Meltzoff suggests that imitation may thereby play a role in
learning and socialization during infancy.
Meltzoff (1988a) investigated the ability of 9-month-
olds to imitate actions on novel objects under immediate and
24-hour delay conditions. Infants in immediate and 24-hour
delay groups were shown a series of three target actions on
three novel test objects. Each action was demonstrated
three times during a 20-second modeling period before moving
on to the next action and object. Following this, half of
the subjects were given an immediate imitation test and half
were given the same test 24 hours later. Subjects were
presented the same objects, one at a time, in their original
sequence. Subjects were allowed a series of three 20-second
response periods, starting from the subjects' first touch of
the object. Three control groups were used. The "baseline"
group did not experience the imitation periods. This group
controlled for the probability of spontaneous production of
the target action. The "adult-touching" group observed an
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adult hold the object during the modeling period but was not
shown the target actions. This condition controlled for the
possibility that subjects might be induced to produce the
target actions by seeing an adult approach and touch the
object. The "adult-manipulation" group observed adults
perform actions on the object that were different from the
target actions, but produced the same consequence (i.e. the
object beeped or rattled). This group controlled for the
possibility that infants who see that objects have
consequences may be more motivated to perform actions on
them.
Results indicated that 9-month-old infants are capable
of both immediate and 24-hour delayed imitation. Infants in
both imitation groups produced significantly more target
behaviors than control groups. The fact that 50 percent of
infants in both the immediate and deferred imitation groups
were assessed "high" imitation scores, meaning that they
produced at least two of the three target behaviors, is
particularly interesting. This suggests that the ability of
9-month-olds to imitate simple action on novel objects is
persistent across a delay of 24 hours. Furthermore, the task
in this study was more difficult and can be considered to
require more memory than the task in the previous Meltzoff
(1985) study. Meltzoff (1985) required that subjects recall
only one action-object pairing, while there were three
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action-object pairings in the Meltzoff (1988a) study. Thus,
subjects in the latter study had more information to process
and recall on the test and potentially had interference from
one task to the next.
However, caution should be exercised when comparing the
results of the above two studies. The results of the
Meltzoff (1985) study showed that infants as young as 14
months of age were able to imitate novel actions on objects.
Meltzoff (1988a) extended these findings to 9-month-olds.
However, the tasks were different in the two studies. The
1985 study tested subjects' ability to imitate a novel
action on a familiar object. The 1988a study tested 9-
month-olds' ability to perform familiar actions on novel
objects. Thus, direct comparisons cannot be drawn between
these two studies. It may be, for example, that at nine
months of age objects are more salient to infants than
actions. Thus, performing a familiar action on a novel
object may be easier than performing a novel action on a
familiar object for 9-month-old infants. If so, Meltzoff
(1988a) may have made the task disproportionately easy for
subjects when compared with Meltzoff (1985). An alternate
hypothesis is that it is simply easier to imitate familiar
actions than nonfamiliar actions. However, it is also
important to note that the 9-month-olds had to imitate three
different actions on three different objects, while 14-and
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24-month-olds had to imitate only one novel action on one
object. Thus, the task for 9-month-olds may have required
more memory than did the task required of 14- and 24-month-
olds. The results of the 9-month-olds are, thus, very
robust, particularly since they were successful at the task
even after a 24-hour delay.
Meltzoff (1988d) used the same procedure to investigate
14-month-olds' ability to imitate novel actions and to defer
imitation up to one week. Infants were shown a series of
six objects and their corresponding actions. One of the
actions was novel and consisted of touching a box with one's
forehead in order to make a light come on inside. The other
five actions were familiar. The purpose of the novel action
was to broaden the range of acts previously studied with 14-
month-olds to include novel actions. Results showed that
infants in the imitation condition produced significantly
more target behaviors than did subjects in the "baseline" or
"adult-manipulation" control conditions after one week.
These studies by Meltzoff have important implications
for infant memory. Results of the 9-month-olds (Meltzoff,
1988a) indicate that infants of this age are able to
recognize objects after a 24-hour retention interval, after
only 20 seconds of familiarization. These infants were also
able to recall object-action relationships after 24 hours,
with only three exposures to the target behavior during the
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same 20-second familiarization period. By 14 months of age,
infants were shown to recall novel actions after delays as
long as one week. This indicates that infants as young as 9
months are able to learn object-action relationships via
observation and that memory for these relationships is very
robust.
A study by Abravanel, Levan-Goldschmidt and Stevenson
(1976) indicated that actions on objects may be more salient
to 6- to 18-month-old infants than actions without objects.
A series of 22 actions were modeled for 6-, 9-, 12-, 15- and
18-month-olds. Thirteen of these were simple actions
performed on common objects, three were actions without
objects which the subjects could see themselves do (e.g.,
pat-a-cake) and six were actions without objects which
subjects could not see themselves do (e.g., open and close
mouth). Subjects were given the opportunity to imitate each
action immediately after it was modeled. A control group
received no modeling, but were given each of the materials
for the actions on objects for one minute and were observed
for five minutes to assess spontaneous production of actions
without objects. Results showed that subjects who received
modeling produced the target action significantly more than
did control subjects. There were significant increases in
imitation across age for most actions between 9 and 12
months of age. Overall, however, actions on objects were
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imitated more than actions that subjects could not see
themselves perform.
Abravanel and Gingold (1985) investigated deferred
imitation in 12- and 18-month-olds on three types of
"object-related actions." The actions were "single/simple
tasks" (e.g., placing a crown on a doll's head),
"reiterative tasks" (e.g., stacking differently shaped
blocks in a particular order) and "sequentially coordinated
tasks" (e.g., creating a rapid two-tone series on a
xylophone). Tasks were individually selected on the basis
that the infant could not perform the target action during a
pretest screening. Subjects were then assigned to either a
"modeling" condition for which the target action for each
task was produced twice by an experimenter or a "control"
condition for which no modeling was provided, but was
allowed to handle the stimuli for 10 additional seconds.
Ten minutes later, all subjects were given a deferred post-
test in which they were again given the stimulus materials
for each task for 60 seconds. A significantly higher
percent of subjects in the modeling condition produced the
target action than did controls for all actions except
"blocks" and "xylophone." It may be that by 12 months of
age infants have had sufficient exposure to similar tasks so
that the target behaviors are already in their repertoire.
A significantly greater percentage of 18-month-olds than 12-
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month-olds performed all "simple/single" action tasks and
"reiterative" action tasks on the post-test. There were no
significant age effects for the "xylophone", one of two
sequentially-coordinated actions. All subjects in control
and modeling groups who did not pass the post-test were
given an immediate imitation phase directly after the post-
test. In this phase subjects saw the same tasks as before
modeled twice and were allowed 60 seconds to reproduce each
target behavior. Thus, subjects who previously served as
controls during the deferred imitation test, as well as
subjects in the modeling condition who failed the test,
became experimental subjects for the immediate test. Fewer
than 50 percent of 12-month-old infants in the immediate
imitation condition were able to imitate any of the actions,
while 18-month-olds were successful at most actions. Also,
there were no significant differences between experimental
and control groups at either age. These results are
inconsistent with those obtained by Meltzoff (1988a), which
showed that 9-month-old infants could imitate simple actions
on novel objects with delays of up to 24 hours. This may be
due to differences in procedures or tasks. For example,
Abravanel and Gingold included only subjects who did not
pass the deferred post-test and control subjects in the
immediate imitation group, rather than randomly assigning
new subjects for the immediate imitation group, as did
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Meltzoff. This procedure may have stacked the odds against
the immediate imitation group in Abravanel and Gingold's
study by sampling a nonrepresentative group of subjects who
had poor imitation skills.
The literature cited above indicates that 6-month-old
infants can imitate simple actions on objects and do so more
readily than they imitate simple facial gestures that they
cannot see themselves perform. By 9 months infants are able
to imitate novel actions on objects up to 24 hours after
modeling has occurred and by 12 months of age, they can
imitate tasks of increasing difficulty, such as sequentially
coordinated actions. Fourteen-month-olds can imitate novel
actions on objects with delays of up to one week and they
can delay imitation of actions on novel objects for 24
hours. These results with 14-month-olds indicate that
memory for the action and the object of that action can
persist for extended periods of time.
38
Chapter III
SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE
The above literature review indicates that infants are
capable of detecting a contingent relationship between their
behavior and the subsequent occurrence of an event. Several
factors contribute to an infant's ability to perceive
contingencies: temporal contiguity between the infant's
behavior and the contingent stimulus event, the rate, delay,
and consistency with which the contingent stimulus event
follows the behavior, and visual displacement of the
contingent stimulus event from the infant's line of sight.
Furthermore, the current literature suggests that
contingency perception is tied to infants' memory capacity
during initial learning. However, once a contingency is
learned, infants have shown persistent memory for contingent
relationships.
Two-month-olds show memory up to one day and 3-month-
olds up to eight days after two training sessions with a
response-contingent stimulus. When given a retrieval cue,
two-month-olds display memory for contingencies up to 14
days, and 3-month-olds up to 28 days. In addition, 2- and
3-month-old infants have displayed sensitivity to changes in
contingent-feedback stimuli on long-term retention tests.
Further, a 40 percent discrepancy in appearance between a
response-contingent stimulus used during training and one
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presented to an infant on a subsequent memory test, resulted
in response rates that were significantly below baseline
rates. This indicates that infants encode specific
information about the features of contingent stimuli.
The literature also indicates that the ability to detect
and learn contingencies is present by two months of age,
suggesting that infants may be predisposed to readily
develop this skill. Contingency perception may thus be an
ecologically adaptive ability. If so, infants may be more
attuned to information about contingent events, or may be
more stimulated to learn about contingent than noncontingent
events. This area of perception is largely unexplored.
Much research has focused on infants' abilities to
perceive contingencies. However, there is no empirical
evidence regarding the subsequent memory for contingent
versus noncontingent events and objects. Infants may, for
example, remember contingent objects longer than
noncontingent objects. If, in fact, contingent and
noncontingent relationships are differentially processed or
encoded, it would have several implications for the study of
infant cognitive development. For example, if memory for
contingency is more robust or lasts longer than memory for
noncontingent events, researchers should move on to find out
why. One possibility is that contingencies may be more
reinforcing, may provide more information about events or
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objects or may simply be more arousing than noncontingent
events or objects. This is suggested in the literature.
Several studies discussed above have shown that
contingency produces a greater amount of positive affect
than does noncontingent exposure to the same stimuli
(Gunnar, 1980; Gunnar-Vongnechten, 1978; Lewis, Sullivan &
Brooks-Gunn, 1985; Watson & Ramey, 1969). Also, at least
one study has demonstrated that infants will engage in a
contingent task longer than a noncontingent task (Lewis,
Sullivan & Brooks-Gunn, 1985).
Furthermore, teaching strategies may be modified to be
more effective if contingency is found to better facilitate
memory for learned behaviors. For instance, Watson, Hayes
and Vietze (1982) used the principles of contingent
reinforcement as intervention for a developmentally delayed
infant. The subject's motor skills improved and there was
evidence that she learned to discriminate instrumental
contingencies after a four-month period in which the subject
experienced response-contingent stimulation. This study
points to a need for further investigation of response-
contingent reinforcement programs as possible treatments for
developmentally delayed children.
The following research focused on infants' abilities to
learn and remember the relationship between their actions
and the contingent occurrence of a dynamic stimulus event.
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Differential memory for contingent versus noncontingent
stimulus events was also assessed.
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Chapter IV
METHODOLOGY
The literature shows that infants are capable of
encoding and retrieving information about contingent events
(Sullivan, Rovee-Collier & Tynes, 1979; Greco, Rovee-
Collier, Hayne, Griesler & Earley, 1986 & Davis & Rovee-
Collier, 1983) and that relationships between actions and
objects can be learned via imitation (Abravanel & Gingold,
1985; Abravanel, Levan-Goldschmidt & Stevenson, 1976;
Meltzoff 1985, 1988a & 1988d). However, there are several
gaps in the contingency literature. For example, it is not
known how behavior-contingent experience with a stimulus
interacts with memory for the contingency. At least two
questions may be asked in this regard: 1) Do infants
remember objects that they can control better than objects
that they cannot control, 2) Do infants show different
temporal patterns of memory for objects versus actions?
Another compelling reason to study the relationship
between contingency learning and memory is the potentially
adaptive implications of remembering contingencies. Most
infants are exposed to an array of individuals from birth.
Some of those persons will be care providers and will
respond contingently to the infant's solicitations for care
(e.g., mom, dad, grandmother). Other individuals to whom
the infant may be exposed, even on a regular basis, may not
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respond to the infants solicitations for care (e.g., an
older sibling, a neighbor). It would seem beneficial for
the infant to learn and remember, for example, who will feed
him/her when he/she produces a 'hunger' cry. Thus, the
ability to remember care providers (i.e., the providers of
contingent stimulation), perhaps better than other persons
not falling into this category, may prepare the infant to
function more effectively in his/her environment. If so,
remembering contingent relationships better than
noncontingent ones may be ecologically adaptive.
Infants may be predisposed to pay more attention to
stimuli that provide contingent feedback than to
noncontingent stimuli. Therefore, infants who experience
behavior-contingent presentations of an event may be able to
retain information about that event longer than would be
possible given an equal amount of noncontingent exposure to
the event.
The area of contingency perception and learning by
infants offers divers lines of research which may be
pursued. The following research was conducted to broaden
the knowledge base with regard to the relationship between
infant memory and operant behavioral contingencies. The
objective of the present study was to determine if there are
differences in infants' memory for behavior-contingent
versus noncontingent dynamic objects and for behavior-
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contingent objects versus the controlling behavior. Two
research questions were addressed.
First, does having control over a dynamic object (i.e.
contingency) result in longer memory for that object when
compared to a non-controllable object? It was predicted
that having control over a dynamic object would help infants
to remember that object better than if the object were not
controllable. The additional interactive property of
contingency may provide another aspect of the object to be
remembered. For example, in addition to remembering, "This
is the object that I saw," contingent relationships may also
provide the opportunity to remember, "This is the object
that I turned off and on." In other words, the contingent
aspect of the object may be another feature, in addition to
its shape, color, size and texture, etc. that the infant can
remember. Thus, contingency may function as an additional
retrieval cue at the time of recall.
Another possibility is that having control over an
object makes it more interesting. The infant may thus
attend more to the features of contingent objects versus
noncontingent objects. This may, in turn, better facilitate
memory for the contingent object. However, a competing
hypothesis is that not having control over a stimulus might
make that stimulus more intriguing than one which can be
controlled. Once the infant learns a contingent
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relationship between his/her behavior and the onset of a
dynamic event, the object/source of that stimulation
becomes predictable for the infant. On the other hand,
objects that provide noncontingent and randomly timed
stimulation are not predictable. This factor of
unpredictability may make noncontingent sources of
stimulation more compelling to look at for the infant. If
so, infants may be more attentive to noncontingent stimuli,
which may, in turn, facilitate more persistent memory for
the noncontingent stimulus than for the contingent stimulus.
The second research question addressed by this study
was, do infants have long-term memory for the action which
produces the contingent event? The conjugate reinforcement
studies by Rovee-Collier and her colleagues have clearly
shown that young infants show memory for the controlling
behavior for at least eight days. However, in the conjugate
reinforcement paradigm, the infant controls the mobile via a
cord that is attached to his/her foot and the mobile. Thus,
the mechanism for producing the contingent feedback connects
the infant directly to the source of contingent feedback.
In essence, the infant manipulates the mobile directly.
It is possible, for instance, that infants in a mobile
conjugate reinforcement procedure do not realize that the
cord tied to their feet functions as a manipulandum by which
to move the mobile. Evidence of this is suggested by the
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phase and the familiar stimulus object was placed on the
pedestal. During the action test, the familiar stimulus
object was not activated, regardless of the subject's
actions on the manipulanda. The test lasted for 60 seconds,
beginning with the first action on either of the
manipulanda. The dependent variable for this test was the
proportion of target actions relative to target plus non-
target actions. Following the action test, the familiar
stimulus object was removed. The reminder phase then
followed.
Reminder. The beginning of the reminder phase was
marked by an experimenter introducing her hands through the
screen and clapping three times. The experimenter then
placed the familiar stimulus object on the pedestal once
again. The purpose of this phase is to overcome possible
extinction effects of the test phase on the learning of the
contingency (for subjects in the contingent groups). That
is, the test phase essentially exposed all subjects to the
stimulus object for two minutes, during which the object
could not be controlled. This could have functioned as an
extinction phase for subjects in contingent groups. Thus,
all subjects were given an additional 15-cumulative seconds
of familiarization to the stimulus object during the
reminder phase. This phase was run exactly like the
familiarization phase for all subjects. The yoked procedure
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described for the familiarization phase was also employed
during the reminder phase.
One-week return. The second visit to the lab consisted
of a second memory for the object test, which differed from
the first only in that a third stimulus served as the novel
object. This was followed by a second memory for the action
test, which was identical to the first.
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Results
Memory for the object
During the short-term (10 min,) novelty-familiarity
preference memory test, subjects in both groups looked at
the stimulus objects an average of 38.8 seconds (SD = 10.6)
of the allotted 60 seconds during the test trials. Thus,
subjects looked 65 percent of the available time to the
objects. During the long-term (one week) memory test,
subjects looked to the stimuli an average of 41.8 seconds
(SD = 10.4). This was 70 percent of the available 60
seconds. A one-way ANOVA on Condition (contingent vs.
noncontingent) was run on the total amount of time the
subjects spent fixating the stimuli across both memory
tests. This analysis revealed no significant effect of
Condition (F 1 2 2 = 0.18, p > .10).
The proportion of total looking time (PTLT) that
subjects spent fixating the novel stimulus object was the
used to index memory for the familiar stimulus object during
the novelty-familiarity preference tests. PTLT scores
reflect the average proportion of looking to the novel
stimulus across the two test trials. Each subject, thus,
generated two PTLT scores, one for the short-term memory
test and one for the long-term memory test.
Two hypotheses were made regarding subjects' performance
on this measure: 1) only subjects in contingent condition
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were predicted to show (long-term) memory for the familiar
stimulus after the one-week retention interval, 2) infants
in both conditions were predicted to show (short-term)
memory for the familiar stimulus after the 10-minute
retention interval. To test these hypotheses, a repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted on Condition X Time on PTLT to
the novel stimulus. Although a significant Condition by
Time interaction was predicted, the ANOVA test indicated no
significant interaction (F 22 = .41, p > .10). There was
also no main effect of Condition (El22 =.73, p> .10) or Time
(F1,22 =.22, p >.10). Independent t-tests on PTLT scores,
for each condition at each retention interval, against a
chance level of looking (.50) also failed to yield
significant results. The result of this test indicated that
subjects had no preference for either the familiar or novel
stimulus (t23 = 0.667, p >.10) . Table 3 shows the means
and standard deviations for subjects in both conditions
across time.
The obtained results were not expected. However, if
subjects demonstrated transient memory across test trials,
it is possible that averaging PTLT scores across trials
masked this effect. Thus, a repeated-measures ANOVA on
Condition X Trials was conducted, on PTLT scores for the
four trials across both tests. Again, no main effects for
Condition (Fl, 22 = 0.75, p > .10) or Trial (01 ,22 = 1.03, p >
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.10) were found, nor was there a significant interaction
(f1,22 = 0.25, p > .10). Separate repeated-measures ANOVA
tests for each test on Condition X Trial also failed to
reach significance.
Secondary analyses were conducted to rule out the
effects of possible confounding variables. In order to
determine if there was a preference for one of the three
stimuli, the proportion of time the subjects spent fixating
each of the three stimulus objects was calculated (across
the two memory test). The mean proportion of time subjects
(N=24) spent fixating the red, blue and yellow objects was
.56 (SD = .13), .49 (SD = .13) and .46 (SD = .10)
respectively. A repeated measures ANOVA on PTLT by Color
indicated significant differences among these means (F24, =
3.26, p <.05). Post-hoc independent t-tests revealed a
significant difference between the proportion of time
infants fixated the red versus the yellow stimulus objects
(t23 = 2.70, p < .05). No other means differed
significantly. Independent t-test against a chance level of
.50 was run across conditions on the proportion of time the
subjects fixated the stimulus on the right for each of the
object memory tests. No significant side bias was found on
either the short-term memory test (M = .48, SD = .121, 23 =
0.72, p > .10) or the long-term memory test (M = .51, SD =
.15 ta3  = 0.20, p > .10).
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In summary, the analyses of the object test data failed
to support the main hypotheses. Furthermore, no evidence of
recognition memory was shown by the subjects on either of
the two memory tests. It is unlikely that the 7.5- to 8-
month-old subjects were not able to recall the appearance of
the familiar object. Alternative explanations for this
result are discussed in Chapter 6.
Memory for the action
The proportion of target actions (PTA) was used as the
dependent variable in order to assess the subjects'
preferences for the target manipulandum across each phase of
the experiment (i.e., baseline, familiarization, action test
1 and action test 2). PTA scores were calculated by
dividing the total number of target actions in each phase by
the total number of actions on both manipulanda during that
phase. A one-way ANOVA by Condition was run on baseline PTA
scores to establish that there were no initial differences
between the conditions. As predicted, subjects in the
contingent and noncontingent groups performed similarly
during the baseline phase (F122 = 0.90, p > .10). The means
and standard deviations for PTA scores across phases are
reported for each group in Table 4.
In order to assess contingency learning, baseline PTA
scores were subtracted from familiarization PTA scores and
difference scores were obtained. Only subjects in the
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contingent condition were predicted to show learning of the
contingency. This hypothesis was supported by the results
of independent t-tests on difference scores against zero.
The subjects in the contingent group significantly increased
the number of target actions from baseline to
familiarization (M = .25, SD = .26, t = 3.125, p < .01),
indicating that they learned the action-object relation.
Subjects in the noncontingent group showed no increase in
target actions (M = .00, SD = .38, t = 0.00, p > .10).
However, a one-way ANOVA indicated only a marginally
significant difference between the group means (F,22 = 3.48,
p = .08). This was expected given the large standard
deviations in both groups.
Difference scores were calculated for PTA scores for the
short-term (10 min.) and long-term (one week) action memory
tests. A repeated measures ANOVA was run on Condition X
Phase (familiarization, action test 1 and action test 2)
with difference scores against baseline as the repeated
dependent variable. Although group means appeared to differ
(see Table 4), the standard deviations were very high, and
no significant effects were found in this analysis.
Because of the variability that difference scores
against baseline contributed to the data, the same analysis
was conducted on PTA scores. Subjects in the contingent
condition were predicted to have consistently higher PTA
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scores than subjects in the noncontingent condition. To
test this hypothesis a repeated measures ANOVA was run on
Condition X Phase on with PTA scores as the repeated
dependent variable. This analysis revealed a main effect of
Condition (F, 22 = 20.25, p < .001). There was no main
effect of Phase or a Condition by Phase interaction. The
results of the two above analyses suggest that baseline PTA
scores were highly variable, thus, the use of difference
scores obscured real differences between the groups on PTA
scores.
Subjects in the contingent condition were expected to
demonstrate short- (10 minutes) and long-term (one week)
memory for the target action as indexed PTA scores
significantly above .50 during the action tests. Subjects
in the noncontingent conditions were expected to demonstrate
nonsignificant PTA scores across the two tests since there
was no contingency for them to remember. Independent t-
tests against .50 supported the above hypothesis. Table 4
shows that subjects in the contingent condition maintained
PTA scores significantly higher than .50 during the short-
term and long-term memory for the action tests. However,
the PTA scores of subjects in the noncontingent group failed
to reach significance on either test.
Independent t-tests were also run on difference scores
in order to test if subjects maintained PTA scores above
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baseline levels. The results of these tests, also shown in
Table 4, reveal that subjects in the contingent condition
maintained significantly higher than baseline levels of
target actions on the short-term memory test, but not on the
long-term memory test. This is likely due to a large amount
of variability during baseline, which is included in the
difference score. Subjects in the noncontingent group
showed no significant levels of target actions relative to
baseline on either memory test.
Collectively, the above results indicate that there was
no initial difference in PTA scores between the conditions
during baseline. However, subjects in the contingent
condition learned the object-action relationship during
familiarization and were able to recall it 10 minutes and
one week after original learning. Subjects in the
noncontingent condition showed only random and
nonsignificant action preferences throughout the action
phases of the experiment.
Secondary analyses were conducted to rule out
confounding variables. A repeated measures ANOVAs were run
on Target Action X Phase and Target Side X Phase for PTA
scores during baseline, familiarization and both memory
tests to determine if subjects had a manipulandum or side
(i.e., the lateral position of the target manipulandum)
preference. The results of these tests revealed no main
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effects of Target Action (FE 2 2 = .00, p = .96) or Target
Side (E,22 = .03, p = .86) . Also, ANOVAs revealed no sex
differences in PTA scores across phases (F122 = .21, p =
.66).
Interobserver Reliability
VTisual preference data. Interobserver reliability was
calculated on the PTLT scores of 11 (46 % of the sample)
randomly-selected subjects. A secondary observer who was
unaware of the condition to which subjects were assigned
observed the short-term (10 min.) memory for the object
test. The proportion of total looking time subjects spent
fixating the novel stimulus (PTLT) was calculated for each
trial. PTLT scores derived from the observations of the
secondary and primary observers were subjected to a Pearson
Product-Moment correlation yielding 98 percent reliability.
Action data. The action data of the same 10 subjects
was used to calculate interobserver reliability for the
subjects actions on the manipulanda. A secondary observer
recorded the number of actions on each of the two
manipulanda throughout the experiment. The proportion of
target actions (PTA) was calculated for each phase of the
experiment (baseline, familiarization, action test 1,
reminder and action test 2). Pearson Product-Moment
correlations were run on PTA scores derived from the
observations of the secondary and primary observers for each
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phase individually and across phases. Across phases, inter-
observer agreement was 96 percent reliable. Correlations
for individual phases range are shown in Table 5.
Data from dropped and attrition sublects
Primary analyses were conducted on the memory for the
object data and the memory for the action data of the 12
subjects who were dropped from the experiment. This was
done to ensure that subject loss was not selective and thus
did not bias the data. A repeated measures ANOVA on
Condition X Time for PTLT scores failed to yield significant
main effects of Condition (F1 10 = .31, p = .59) or Time (F, 0
= .31, P = .59) or an interaction (F1 10 = .26, p = .62).
Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 6.
A repeated measures ANOVA on Condition X Phase for PTA
scores also failed to yield a main effect of Condition (E110
= 1.35, P = .27) or Phase (F1 10 = .74, p = .57) or an
interaction (F1 10 = .93, p = .45). See Table 7 for means
and standard deviations. The same analyses were run
collapsing the data from the subjects who were dropped from
the experiment with those of the final sample (N=36).
Again, no significant effects were revealed. Thus, subjects
who were dropped from the experiment and did not differ from
the final sample with respect to visual preferences during
the object memory tests or PTA scores across phases.
The data generated by attrition subjects on the first
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day of testing was collapsed with that of the final sample
and primary analyses were again conducted. This resulted in
a group of 19 subjects in the contingent condition and 15
subjects in the noncontingent condition (N = 34). The data
for the first object memory test were subjected to a one-way
ANOVA by Condition on PTLT scores to the novel stimulus. As
in the original analysis of the final sample data, no
significant preferences were found. The same analysis with
the data generated by attrition subjects only also revealed
no significant effect. Independent t-tests against a chance
level of .50 were run by condition on the combined data of
the final sample and attrition subject. The results of
these analyses are presented in Table 8. No significant
effects were found.
A Condition X Phase (familiarization and action test 1)
repeated measures ANOVA on PTA scores revealed no
significant effect of condition (F, 32 = 2,74, p > .05).
This was inconsistent with the results of the main analyses
on the final sample data. The discrepancy may have been due
to the fact that the Condition X Phase repeated measures for
final sample included three phases, whereas it was only
possible to include two phases for the analysis with
attrition data because infants who did not return for the
second visit did not receive the second memory test. This
same analysis on the data generated by attrition subjects
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only (N = 10) failed to yield significant results. Based on
the above analyses it may be concluded that subject
attrition did not contribute to the effects found in the
final data sample.
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Discussion
The results of this study provide valuable and
previously unavailable information about 7.5- to 8-month-
olds' memory for contingent versus noncontingent events.
The mobile conjugate reinforcement studies have shown that
3-month-old infants can remember how to control an object
for up to eight days following 18 minutes of conjugate
training (Sullivan, Rovee-Collier & Tynes, 1979). Although
the present study was conducted with 7.5- to 8-month-old
subjects, the paradigm employed here afforded subjects, on
average, only 2.5 minutes of training. Also, the training
situation in the present study required subjects to
discriminate among two potential operants (i.e., two
possible controlling actions). Subjects in the contingent
group learned which of two actions controlled an object and
they subsequently displayed long-term memory for that action
one week later. These results are consistent with those of
Sullivan, Rovee-Collier and Tynes (1979) and extend the
findings to a different testing paradigm.
However, in the current study memory for the object
itself was not evident, regardless of whether the infants
controlled the object or not. Thus, there was no evidence
to support the hypothesis that controllable objects would be
remembered longer than uncontrollable ones. This result is
somewhat inconsistent with those of Rovee-Collier, Patterson
71
and Hayne (1985). Using the mobile conjugate reinforcement
paradigm, these authors found that a test mobile different
from the training mobile resulted in significantly decreased
response rates among 2- and 3-month-olds 24 hours after
training. This suggests that infants were able discriminate
the novel mobile from the training mobile, which requires
memory of the training mobile itself. Therefore, in the
present study it is remarkable that 7.5- to 8-month-old
infants showed no memory for the stimulus object either at
10 minutes or one week after training.
These results raise interesting questions regarding the
effects of contingent experience on memory, as assessed by
the novelty preference method, and infants' perceptions of
contingency. There are three possible explanations for
such findings: 1) the stimulus objects were not
discriminable to the infants, 2) the infants did not
remember the familiar stimulus at either 10 minutes or one
week after familiarization, or 3) the conditions of the
study did not facilitate subjects' demonstrating memory for
the stimulus objects. Of the three alternatives, the third
seems most likely, given the age of the subjects.
There are several reasons why the conditions of the study
may have contributed to the obtained anomalous results.
First, perhaps interest in the nature of the object was
overshadowed by the subjects' strong interest in the
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manipulanda. The presence of the manipulanda during the
familiarization phase may have distracted infants from
noticing the appearance of the stimulus objects, such that
memory for the object was inhibited. Second, the 1-minute
cumulative familiarization time that the subjects received
with the familiar stimulus object may not have been
sufficient to produce a significant novelty preference.
Third, it may be that the effects of contingency interact
with memory such that the visual preference method is not
suitable for detecting infants' memory for the familiar
stimulus object. Specifically, there may be a competing
tendency for infants of this age to look at novel stimuli
versus stimuli which they were previously able to control.
Although subjects in the noncontingent condition did not
control the stimulus, their actions on the manipulanda often
coincided with the activation of the stimulus object. Thus,
some subjects in the noncontingent group may have perceived
that they controlled the stimulus even though they did not.
If so, then in terms of the effect of contingency on memory,
the two treatment groups did not differ. Future studies
should clarify the nature of the interaction between
contingency perception and memory.
The fact that infants in the contingent condition showed
long-term memory for the controlling action though they
failed to show memory for the object of their control is
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notable. Perhaps by 7.5 months of age infants attend more
to actions, or objects that can be acted upon, rather than
visual stimuli per se. Further research is needed to
establish the temporal limits of action memory under the
conditions of this study.
In conclusion, the research presented above raises
several questions regarding the role of contingency
perception in memory. Though the hypothesis that infants
would remember controllable objects longer than non-
controllable objects was not supported, the results of this
study are inconclusive with respect to the cause of null
findings. This research also introduces a new paradigm for
testing infants' memory for contingencies.
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Figure 1. Red, blue and yellow stimulus obiects, from left
to right.
80
Figure 2. Apparatus from the infant's perspective.
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Table 1.
Between- and within-subiects independent variables and
levels.
Independent
Variables Levels
Between Condition Contingent
Noncontingent
Within Retention 10 minutes
Interval One week
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Table 2.
Complete counterbalancing of between-subjects independent
variables and levels (N= 24).
Variable Levels N
Condition Contingent 12
Noncontingent 12
Target Pull Lever 12
Action Turn Wheel 12
Action Left 12
Side Right 12
Stimulus Red 8
Object Blue 8
Yellow 8
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Table 3.
Means and standard deviations for subiects in both
conditions across time (N = 24).
Condition
Contingent Noncontingent
10 minutes M= .516 M= .528
SD= .146 SD= .145
Time
1 week M= .476 M= .535
SD= .106 SD= .136
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Table 4.
ANOVA and t-test results for PTA and difference scores.
Condition
Phase Contingent Noncontingent F
Baseline .50 .41 0.90
(.24) (.23)
t = 0.00 t= 1.28
Familiarization .75 .41 13.15 ***
(.16) (.28)
t = 3.12 ** t = 1.12
Action Test 1 .68 .53 1.71
(.20) (.33)
t = 2.25 * t = 0.30
Action Test 2 .67 .48 3.02
(.21) (.32)
t =2.83 * t = 0.22
Fa. Diff .25 .00 3.48
(.26) (.38)
t = 3.12 * t = 0.00
Test 1 Diff .18 .12 0.19
(.28) (.33)
t = 3.00 * t = 1.0
Test 2 Diff .17 .07 0.34
(.33) (.50)
t = 1.70 t = 0.50
NOTE: T-tests on difference scores were against zero.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Table 6.
PTLT scores on memory for the obi ect tests for subjeacts who
were droped from the exeriment (N = 12)}
Condition
Contingent Noncontingent
n= 9 n= 3
10 minutes M = .512 M= .539
SD= .188 SD= .210
Object test
n = 9 n = 3
1 week M= .498 M= .582
SD= .101 SD= .139
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Table 5.
Pearson product moment correlations of primary and secondary
observer PTA scores across thases.
Phase r
Baseline .95
Familiarization .94
Action test 1 .93
Reminder 1.0
Action test 2 .99
Overall .96
86
Table 8.
Mean PTLT scores on the first memory for oblect test for the
ffinal sample and att rit ionu ubects ( = 3 5 }
Condition
Contingent Noncontingent
n = 20 n = 15
M = .543 M = .481
SD= .175 SD= .166
t = 1.11 t=.44
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